
A Realist Theory Of International Politics

*A Realist
Theory Of
International
Politics*

Downloaded from
web1.enterskincare.com
by Elena & Avery

INTRODUCTION: THE ENDURING LOGIC OF POWER AND SURVIVAL

Few theoretical frameworks have shaped the study of global politics as profoundly as realism. At its core, **A Realist Theory Of International Politics** offers a sobering lens through which to understand why states behave the way they do, why conflict persists, and why cooperation often remains elusive. While idealism may dream of

perpetual peace and liberal institutions may champion global governance, realism insists that the international arena is not a community but an arena—a realm of recurring competition where power is the ultimate currency and survival the primary objective. This article provides a comprehensive exploration of realist thought, tracing its historical roots, unpacking its key assumptions, examining its major variants, and assessing its relevance in the twenty-first century. By

understanding the realist worldview, readers gain not just a theory but a practical toolkit for decoding the motives behind statecraft, from ancient Athens to modern geopolitical rivalries.

THE FOUNDATIONAL ASSUMPTIONS OF REALISM

Before diving into the nuances of different realist schools, it is essential to grasp the shared assumptions that unite all versions of **A Realist Theory Of International Politics**. These premises act as the bedrock upon which the entire intellectual edifice rests.

The Primacy of the State

Realists treat the sovereign state as the principal actor in world politics. Non-state actors—international organizations, multinational corporations, NGOs—are considered secondary or even epiphenomenal. States are unitary, rational actors that speak with one voice on matters of national security. While domestic politics may influence decisions, the external imperative of survival ultimately overrides internal divisions.

The International System Is Anarchic

This is perhaps the single most critical concept. Anarchy, in realist terminology, does not mean chaos. It means the absence of a central authority—a world government—that can enforce rules or guarantee security. In a domestic society, individuals can appeal to a police force or a court; in international politics, states must look after themselves. This self-help condition creates a constant sense of uncertainty

and fear.

The Struggle for Power

Because anarchy breeds insecurity, states accumulate power—military, economic, diplomatic—to ensure their survival. The distribution of power shapes outcomes, from war and peace to alliances and trade. Realists argue that a state's foreign policy can best be explained by its position in the international power hierarchy, not by its ideology or domestic regime type.

Human

Nature

and the

Drive for

Dominan

ce

Classical realists, starting with Thucydides and later articulated by Hans Morgenthau, ground their theory in a pessimistic view of human nature. Humans are driven by a lust for power, and this inherent selfishness is projected onto the state. Structural realists (neorealists) downplay human nature, emphasizing instead the pressures of the anarchic system,

but both strands agree that conflict is a recurrent, not accidental, feature.

CLASSICAL REALISM: THE PHILOSOPHY OF POWER POLITICS

The intellectual lineage of **A Realist Theory Of International Politics** can be traced back over two millennia. Classical realism draws wisdom from history, philosophy, and tragedy.

Thucydides and the Peloponn

Peloponnesian War

The Athenian historian Thucydides is often called the first realist. His account of the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE) between Athens and Sparta contains the famous dictum that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Thucydides understood that the growth of Athenian power alarmed Sparta, making war inevitable. This insight—that **power transitions** cause conflict—remains central to realist analysis today. The Melian Dialogue, where Athens demands submission from neutral Melos, starkly illustrates that justice is only possible

between equals; in anarchy, power dictates.

Niccolò Machiavelli: The Prince and Statecraft

Renaissance thinker Niccolò Machiavelli reshaped realism by advising rulers to prioritize security above morality. In *The Prince*, he argued that a leader must be willing to deceive, manipulate, and use force when necessary. Good intentions are irrelevant if the state perishes. Machiavelli’s

realism is cold and pragmatic: the ends of survival justify any means. His emphasis on **raison d'état** (reason of state) became a hallmark of realist diplomacy.

Hans Morgenthau: Politics Among Nations

The founding father of modern realism, Hans Morgenthau, systematized the theory in his 1948 book *Politics Among Nations*. He posited that **international politics is governed by**

objective laws rooted in human nature. Morgenthau's "six principles of political realism" assert that politics is an autonomous sphere, that interest is defined as power, and that universal moral principles cannot be applied to state actions. For Morgenthau, prudence—the weighing of consequences—is the supreme virtue in statecraft.

STRUCTURAL REALISM (NEOREALISM): THE SYSTEM AS EXPLANATION

In 1979, Kenneth Waltz published *Theory of International Politics*, revolutionizing realism by moving the explanatory focus from human nature to the

structure of the international system. This is known as neorealism or structural realism.

The Distribution of Capabilities

Waltz argued that the anarchic system has a defining structure: how power is distributed among states. The two main structures are bipolarity (two great powers, as in the Cold War) and multipolarity (three or more, as in nineteenth-century Europe). **Bipolarity is more stable**, Waltz claimed, because great powers cannot

miscalculate each other's capabilities as easily. Neorealists analyze how the system *constrains* state behaviour, forcing states to emulate successful rivals and balance against threatening powers.

Balancing vs. Bandwag oning

A key neorealist prediction is that states tend to **balance** against the most powerful or most threatening state, rather than bandwagon with it. Balancing restores equilibrium; bandwag oning encourages

aggression. This explains why coalitions form against rising hegemon - for instance, the coalitions against Napoleonic France or Nazi Germany.

OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE REALISM

Within the neorealist tradition, a major debate emerged between offensive and defensive variants. Both accept the core assumptions of anarchy and self-help but diverge on how much security is enough.

Offensive Realism:

The Quest for Hegemon

y

Championed by John Mearsheimer in *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, offensive realism holds that anarchy creates a deep fear of uncertainty. Even a state with no aggressive intentions cannot be sure of other states' future intentions. Therefore, the safest strategy is to maximize relative power, ideally achieving **regional hegemony** (global hegemony is impossible given the "stopping power of water"). Offensive

realists predict great powers will constantly seek opportunities to improve their position, leading to permanent great-power rivalry.

Defensive Realism: Security Can Be Achieved

Defensive realists, such as Kenneth Waltz (in his later work) and Stephen Walt, argue that states seek **optimal security**, not maximum power. Power accumulation can provoke counterbalancing and backfire. The “security dilemma” occurs when a state’s defensive measures are

perceived by others as offensive, triggering an arms race. Defensive realists believe that **geography, technology, and the offense-defense balance** shape whether conflict or cooperation prevails. Sometimes the system can be cooperative—defensive realists point to the long peace after 1945 as evidence that nuclear weapons make conquest too costly.

Key Differences Summarized

RELEVANCE AND zed

- **Offensive realism:** States are “power maximizers”; they want to dominate the system if possible.
- **Defensive realism:** States are “security maximizers”; they can be satisfied with a balance of power.
- **Policy implication:** Offensive realism warns of inevitable conflict; defensive realism sees room for stable deterrence.

CONTEMPORARY

CRITIQUES

Does **A Realist Theory Of International Politics** still explain the world today? Critics point to globalization, international law, and the rise of non-state actors as evidence that realism is outdated. Proponents insist that the realist core remains valid under the surface of transnational cooperation.

Realism and the Post-Cold War Era

The end of the Cold War initially seemed to challenge realism, as

the Soviet Union collapsed not due to military defeat but internal disintegration. However, realists argued that bipolar structure dissolved, and the unipolar moment of American hegemony followed exactly the logic of power distribution. The expansion of NATO eastward, the 2003 Iraq War, and the rise of China are all interpreted through realist lenses—especially **power transition theory**, which predicts conflict when a rising power challenges an established hegemon.

The Ukraine

War and Great- Power Rivalry

Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is a textbook realist event. Offensive realists point to NATO enlargement as a perceived existential threat that pushed Russia to act defensively (or offensively, depending on the interpretation). Defensive realists emphasize the security dilemma: both sides' actions, intended for security, sparked war. The conflict illustrates realism's core—**territorial security, zero-sum thinking, and the**

primacy of military power.

Climate Change and Non-Traditional Security

Realism is often criticized for ignoring transnational issues like climate change, pandemics, and cyber threats. Yet realists respond that these issues are addressed only when powerful states perceive them as threats to their national interests. For example, the United States and China cooperate on climate

only when it aligns with economic and geopolitical competition.

Environmental security remains subordinate to state sovereignty.

Liberal and Constructivist Critiques

Liberal theorists argue that realism underestimates the transformative power of democracy, free trade, and international institutions.

Constructivists, such as Alexander Wendt, argue that anarchy is what states make of it—identities and

norms can change, enabling cooperation. Realists counter that liberalism's optimism ignores human history; institutions are mere tools of the powerful, and norms collapse when pushed against hard power interests.

KEY CONTRIBUTIONS OF REALIST THEORY

Despite its flaws, realism offers indispensable insights:

1. **Rational analysis of power:** It provides clear tools for assessing relative strength and predicting behaviour.
2. **Focus on survival:** In an anarchic world, no state can

ignore security, no matter how prosperous.

3. **Explanation of recurring conflict:** Realism accounts for wars that idealist theories cannot.
4. **Pragmatic policy guidance:** Leaders from Bismarck to Kissinger have used realist logic successfully.

CONCLUSION: THE UNCOMFORTABLE TRUTH

A Realist Theory Of International Politics may not offer a comforting vision, but it provides clarity. It strips away illusions about moral progress in world affairs and forces us to confront the enduring reality of power competition.

While globalization, international law, and democratic peace theory have changed certain dynamics, they have not eliminated the basic condition of anarchy or the drive for security. The rise of China, the resurgence of Russia, and the instability of the Middle East all validate realism's fundamental insights. For students, policymakers, and citizens, understanding realism is not a choice—it is a necessity. By embracing the realist lens, we can better navigate a world where peace remains fragile, trust is scarce, and the shadow of power looms over every diplomatic exchange. Ultimately, realism teaches a timeless lesson: in the theater of international politics, hope must be tempered by prudence, and morality must never blind us to the facts of power.